In contrast to traditional approaches to patronage politics, in which politicians directly buy electoral support from individuals, we examine how parties can elicit widespread electoral support by offering to allocate benefits to the group giving it the most support. Provided that the party can observe group level voting, this mechanism incentivizes voters to support a party even when the party is expected to enact policies against their interests. When a party allocates rewards contingent upon group-level voting results, voters can be pivotal both in terms of effecting who wins the election and in influencing which group gets the benefits. The latter (prize pivotalness) dominates the former (outcome pivotalness), particularly once a patronage party is anticipated to win. By characterizing voting equilibria in such a framework we explain the rationale for the support of patronage parties, variance in voter turnout and the endogenous political polarization of groups.
INTRODUCTION
We investigate two questions central to understanding electoral politics. One asks, why do people vote? As many rational choice critics argue, a vote really only matters 1 if it is decisive, breaking a tie between candidates (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Barzel and Silberberg 1973; Tullock 1967; Green and Shapiro 1996; Geys 2006) . For a nontrivially sized electorate, the odds of being the tie-breaking voter are near zero. With the voter having almost no chance of altering the electoral outcome, the cost of voting, even though small, is still likely to exceed its expected value. A second question focuses on voters, asking what determines how they choose between candidates. Debate in this arena revolves around three bases for choosing for whom to vote: (1) to fulfill some psychological or other source of affinity that leads people to identify with one or another political party across elections (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Beck and Jennings 1982; Bartels 2000) ; (2) to support parties and candidates whose policies the voter favors (Fiorina 1981; Rosenthal 1985, 1991; Myerson 1993; Meirowitz and Schotts 2008) ; or (3) to gain personal patronage rewards or local benefits in the form of pork in exchange for voter support (Ferejohn 1974; Fenno 1978; Schwartz 1987; Stokes 2005 ). We offer a game theoretic solution to these puzzles.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review critical features of the literature on voting, tying it to the literature on patronage and pork barrel politics. Then we introduce our basic model. The model distinguishes between two ways that a voter can be pivotal: (1) in the sense of tipping the outcome of the election one way or the other; and (2) in the sense of providing sufficient electoral support to the winning candidate or party that the voter's group -a discernible voter bloc such as a ward or precinctgets pork or patronage benefits that it otherwise would not have gotten (Schwartz 1987) .
Having examined these concepts of pivotalness, we first derive symmetric voting equilibria.
In these equilibria, voters can rationally support parties even when the policies of those parties harm their welfare. Further in these equilibria voters also want to turnout. We then discuss asymmetric voting equilibria in which each voter group supports the parties at a different rate. We show that asymmetric voting equilibria can produce different turnout rates across the different groups. Further the motivation to support one party rather than another can differ substantially between groups such that one group might vote primarily based on policy differences between the parties, while the vote choice in another might be primarily motivated by pork and patronage. This variation in the motivation for voting 2 is endogenous.
The model's pricipal conceptual innovation is to introduce the idea of contingent prize allocation rules. Rather than assume parties compete solely in terms of public policy or by buying individual votes through patronage, parties are modeled as offering rewards to the most supportive group or groups. By making the allocation of these prizes contingent on group-level support, a party incentivizes groups to coordinate on supporting it. A contingent prize allocation rule converts voting into a competition to show the greatest loyalty to the party expected to win election. Further, precisely because this contingent prize mechanism works by creating intergroup competition to express the greatest loyalty, it does not suffer from credibility concerns that often arise in studies of patronage.
We show that if parties use a contingent prize allocation rule then there will be larger prizes and fewer public goods than is true if parties directly buy individual votes (Lizzeri and Persico 2001) . This discussion provides an explanation for some patronage-based democratic systems, like Tanzania or India, that emulate the corruption and inefficiency conditions of more autocratic regimes. Although all the voters might recognise that they would be better off under a reformist party's rule, established patronage parties persist because each of the voters wants the reformist party elected but with someone else's vote.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our model and offering policy advice for eliminating political patronage.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although it is agreed that voters are unlikely to be pivotal in shaping who wins election 1 , still much of the literature assumes that voters have a dominant incentive to vote as if their vote matters. A number of scholars (for instance Morton 1991 and Shachar and Nalebuff 1999) focus on group rationality and the incentives to follow leaders and argue that this increases voting. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) find that socialization is an important component of how people vote. Others examine the time consistency of voting in shaping future party platforms (Razin 2003; Börgers 2004; Meirowitz and Schotts 2008) . They point to the signaling quality votes have. Meirowitz and Schotts (2008) demonstrate that the signaling interest of voters dominates what we refer to as outcome pivotalness.
Our focus on a contingent prize allocation rule creates an incentive, as we will see, to vote even when the voter has little chance of altering the electoral outcome. Others have also examined targeted rewards in electoral contests, but their interest is not in explaining voting per se. Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001) , for instance, are concerned with identifying voting systems that avoid the inefficiencies introduced by targeted rewards. Schwartz (1987) specifically looks at the use of targeted rewards as a mechanism for inducing rational voter turnout. While agreeing that each voter has a neglible probability of being pivotal in the election as a whole, Schwartz notes that such a voter might well be pivotal in determining whether her precinct, or other sub-district jurisdiction, supports a particular candidate. If candidates reward supportive precincts, then although the individual voter might be insignificant in the election as a whole, still her support might strongly influence the allocation of benefits in a smaller, local jursidiction such as an individual precinct. Indeed, he suggests that voters, tempted by the chance to gain pork or patronage benefits, might even vote for a party they do not favor if it is expected to win election anyway. Schwartz shows that his decision theoretic assessment is more consistent with the evidence for voter turnout than are alternative accounts of the rationality of voting (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 1975 Patronage -the granting of favors and rewards by politicians in exchange for electoral support -is generally viewed within the literature as bad for economic performance and for democracy (Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, ch. 1) . While Lizzeri and Persico (2001) demonstrate that targeted rewards are inefficient 2 , Magaloni (2006) shows empirically that patronage and pork enable incumbent parties to win elections even when they are less popular than the opposition.
Patronage is an effective way to garner political support when voting is not anonymous.
The Australian ballot, an official ballot produced by the state rather than provided by parties, has made it harder for parties to verify voter choice (Stokes 2007, 620-1) . Despite these changes, parties have found ingenious ways to undermine anonymity. For instance, voting machines in New Jersey in the 1890s made different noises depending upon how votes were cast. Chandra (2004) documents how parties in India discern voter choice by frequently emptying the ballot box to provide an ongoing count of the votes. Despite these tricks, the secret ballot has greatly reduced the ability of parties to monitor individual votes (Gerber et al 2009 ). Yet, patronage parties persist. They have, of course, adapted to the impediments secret ballots put in their way. Pork barrel politics, which we refer to throughout as a special form of patronage, focuses benefits on a discernible set of voters, such as those in a ward or precinct, rather than on individual voters.
Time consistency and credible commitment are crucial features of patronage (Stokes 2007) . Parties offer rewards in exchange for votes. Individuals promise to vote for a party in exchange for material benefits. Once elected, the party no longer wants to hand over rewards, and once rewarded the voters can renege on their promise. The anonymous ballot makes the credibility problem even harder to resolve because the party can not verify 2 The empirical record supports the conclusion that targeted rewards retards public goods provision and growth (Chubb 1982; Wilson and Banfield 1963; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Barndt, Bond, Gerring and Moreno 2005; Medina and Stokes 2007 (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004; Guterbock 1980 ). The contingent prize allocation explanation we offer resolves these difficulties. It does so by relying on the use of carefully targeted pork rather than individual patronage.
In our account, pork (Ferejohn 1974 ) is targeted based on a contingent prize allocation rule: benefits (individual and collective; that is, patronage and pork) go to the discernible electoral groups, such as precincts, that give the winning party the greatest support rather than only to individual voters or to the winning candidate's entire constituency. The group-prize mechanism requires that groups be identifiable; that the level of electoral support from each group is observable; and that parties can offer rewards that selectively benefit particular groups. Electoral precincts are one example of groups that fulfill these criteria. Votes are counted at the precinct level and parties can allocate projects to one geographical precinct over another. However, the theory is equally applicable to any other societal groupings that satisfy these criteria, whether these groups are based on linguistic, Within the three group case we show that with a contingent prize allocation rule in place, even when there is a hegemonic party supported by all voters, so that each voter has zero influence over the electoral outcome (that is, voters are not outcome pivotal), the voter's incentive to vote for the hegemonic party is equal to one third of the value of the prize.
As we will see, this incentive is driven by the voter's influence over the allocation of the prize; that is, the voter's prize pivot.
There are n (odd) voters in each of the groups. To win the election, party A needs to win a majority of the votes, that is at least (3n + 1)/2 votes. All votes count equally but votes are reported by group. Parties can not observe how individuals vote; however, they observe electoral results by group or precinct. Parties A and B induce patronage support by promising to reward the precinct that gives it the most support; that is, by promising a prize contingent on electoral support. Later we explain why this promise is credible.
Voters care about two things in choosing for whom to: policy and prizes. Let α be the common voter assessment of the policy-based value of party A relative to party B. In addition to the common benefit, each voter, i, receives ε i benefits if party A is elected.
Voters know their own evaluation of party A, but they do not know the values held by other voters. We assume that each voter's evaluation of party A is independent, with expected value of zero. In particular, we assume that Pr(ε i < x) = F (x), with associated density f (x), which has full support on the real line and is symmetric about zero. The 7 symmetry assumption is not substantively important. Rather we utilize the fact that that follow we assume that ε i is logisitically distributed: wins the election and gives the prize to group G 1 , then all members of G 1 receive value Θ A and the members of the other groups get nothing (even if they also voted, albeit less strongly, in favor of party A). For the time being we assume the size of the prize is fixed and examine the consequences of how it is allocated. Later we examine the trade-off between the provision of public goods, g, and prizes, Θ.
Our primary goal is to understand how a contingent prize allocation rule shapes vote choice within and across groups. We characterize Nash equilibria, where a voting strategy is defined as follows: if voter m's evaluation of party A is ε m then m's strategy is to vote for party A with probability σ m (ε m ). Given such a strategy, the probability that voter m supports party A is
Outcome Pivot, Prize Pivot
Because parties do not see individual votes, they can not allocate prizes based upon individual votes. However they can compare the level of support across different groups (e.g., voter blocs, precincts) and reward the group that produces the most votes by allocating the prize to it. This creates competition to be the most supportive group. While 8 an individual's influence over which party wins an election is small, the voter can remain highly pivotal in the allocation of the prize if a party uses a contingent prize allocation rule.
Unfortunately, due to their opaque nature, it is often difficult to discern the internal workings of patronage parties (Guterbock 1980, p15) . Still, sometimes we are able to observe party rules that are structured to reward supportive groups in much the manner assumed here. For example, Gosnell (1937 p29) Parties can also allocate punishments according to electoral support. In Southern Italian cities, the Christian Democrats threatened merchants with health code violations if they did not support the party (Chubb 1982 ). Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew was notorious for punishing electoral districts by removing public housing benefits if the district did not overwhelmingly support him (Tam 2003) . In Zimbabwe Robert Mugagbe has gone even further. He bulldozed houses and markets in those areas which supported opposition candidates (BBC 2005) . Clearly, some parties allocate rewards and punishments based upon electoral support. An objective of this paper is to see the consequences on voting behavior of such contingent prize allocation rules.
We examine the following simple contingent prize allocation rule in which the winner gives the prize to the group that provided the greatest level of support. If party A's vote totals from groups G 1 , G 2 and G 3 are i, j and k respectively, then the probability that party A allocates the prize to G 1 is Q A (i, j, k), where prize to the group which gives it the most support. However, we envision extensions to compare the properties of different contingent prize allocation rules in a manner similar to the tournaments literature which examines how different compensation and promotion policies elicit different effort levels (Gibbons 1996; Lazear 1995; Lazear and Rosen 1981; Prendergast 1996; Rosen 1986 ).
The key to a contingent prize allocation rules is, as noted earlier, that voters can be outcome pivotal and they can be prize pivotal. We now formally develop the concepts of outcome pivot and prize pivot, restricting our attention to equilibria that are symmetric within group in the sense that all members of a group adopt the same strategy.
Voters from groups G 1 , G 2 and G 3 support party A with probabilities p i , p j and p k .
Let W A represent the probability that party A will win the election if voter m from G 1 votes for A. Similarly, let W B represent the chance A wins if m votes for B. For presentational convenience, throughout we show these calculations from the perspective of a representative voter m from group G 1 and assume that all other members of a group have the same voting strategy. However, this latter assumption can be readily relaxed.
This equation deserves some explanation. The expression is a summation over all the possible vote combinations in the three groups. The term
is the probability that i of the n − 1 other voters in G 1 vote for party A given that each voter in G 1 individually votes for A with probability p i . This formula is taken directly from the binomial theorem. There are analogous expressions for the number of votes for A in groups G 2 and G 3 . The function 1 i+j+k+1≥(3n+1)/2 is an indicator function which takes value 1 when A wins the election, that is when i + j + k + 1 is at least (3n + 1)/2 votes for party A. This indicator function takes value zero when B gets more votes than A. Hence W A is the probability that party A wins if voter m supports it.
If m votes for party B then A receives one fewer votes than in the above case. Therefore party A's probability of winning election, W B , is
We define outcome pivotalness, OP , as the difference between W A and W B . OP represents the traditional concept of pivotalness and is the probability that m's vote changes the electoral outcome.
In addition to determining the electoral winner, a voter's decision can also alter how the winning party distributes the prize. Under the simple contingent prize allocation rule, Q(i, j, k), voter m's group wins the prize if it offers A the greatest level of electoral support. Given the probabilities with which other voters support A, we can calculate the likelihood of m's group winning the prize if m votes for A and if m votes for B. We define AP rize A as the probability that voter m's group (G 1 ) receives the prize from party A if m votes for party A:
Alternatively, if m votes for B, then the chance that m's group receives the prize from A is AP rize B .
The probability of receiving the prize from A is monotonic in m's vote choice,
We define prize pivotalness, P P A , as the difference between AP rize A and AP rize B . It reflects how m's vote choice affects the likelihood of m's group receiving the prize from A.
There are analogous expressions for B's prize allocation, BP rize A , BP rize B and P P B .
Figure 1 assumes that all voters are equally likely to support party A (p = p i = p j = p k ).
The figure plots outcome pivot OP and prize pivots (P P A and P P B ) as a function of p - . Likewise prize pivot, P P A , declines as the size of the electorate grows (again lower lines compared to upper lines). However, provided that p > 1/2 (that is, voters are more likely to vote for A than not), the impact of a voter's decision on the allocation of the prize remains substantially greater than 10% even when the electorate increases to 99 voters (that is, 33
per precinct with 3 precincts). Further, as the individual probability of voting for party A approaches one then prize pivot converges to a third (as p → 1, P P A →
3
). This result is independent of the size of the electorate (but not, of course, to the number of precincts).
5
Hence while the probability of being outcome pivotal becomes vanishingly small as the electorate becomes large, this diminution of pivotalness is not as true in terms of the allocation of the prize.
VOTING DECISIONS
Our analyses characterize Nash equilibria in the voting game. Given the probability with which each of the other 3n − 1 voters vote for A, we examine the vote choice of representative voter m from group G 1 . If m votes for party A, then her expected payoff
is strictly increasing in ε m . In this case voter m's best response is fully characterized by a threshold τ m , where τ m is the value of ε m for which the value of voting for A equals the value of voting for B.
5 In general, if there are S groups then P P A → 1/S. How many groups a constitutency should be divided into is an important political question which we hope to addres in a future paper.
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Since ε m has full support, if OP > 0 there always exists τ m that satisfies equation 4.
If ε m > τ m then σ m (ε m ) = 1; otherwise σ m (ε m ) = 0. We refer to such a strategy as a threshold strategy. If m uses a threshold strategy then the probability that she votes for
Threshold strategies are not the only plausible voting strategies. Voters might always vote for one party independent of their evaluation of the other parties. This might be true, for instance, because of a strong psychological identification with one party over the other (Campbell et al 1960) . We define Z A as the set of voters who always vote for A (independent of their evaluation of A):
We let Z A1 represent the set of voters from group G 1 who always vote for A:
of voters who vote for B independent of their evaluation of party A. Let Z R be the set of voters who randomize for whom they vote in some way:
Note that any voter using a threshold strategy is part of Z R . However, this is not the only kind of randomization. For instance, a voter might flip a coin to decide who to support.
Let the notation |Z A | indicate the number of voters who play the pure strategy of always voting for A.
In the following series of propositions we characterize the properties of Nash equilibria in the voting game. which occurs with probability i∈Z R (1 − p i ), then B wins. Hence W B = 1− i∈Z R (1 − p i ). However, the vote distribution (2,3,3) can not be an equilibrium. The voter supporting B in group G 1 can give her group a one third chance of obtaining the prize if she switches to voting for party A.
Fully Symmetric Equilibria
First we characterize equilibria in which all voters adopt the same voting strategy:
Then we examine asymmetric equilibria in which voting strategies are symmetric within groups but asymmetric across group.
Always Support Party A There always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which all voters choose A (or all choose B). As we have seen, the unanimous choice of one party ensures that each group has a 1/3 chance of receiving the prize. Should any voter support B then her group has no chance of receiving the prize. While no voter is outcome pivotal, they are all pivotal with respect to the prize from party A and so they all strictly want to support party A.
Interior Solutions There are also equilibria with interior solutions characterized by the threshold τ * . Specifically,
and p = F (−τ * ). This is a fixed point. Given the threshold τ * the probability that each voter supports A is p = Pr(ε i ≥
). It is important to differentiate this equilibrium from a common pathology in voting equilibria. Nash equilibria require that no player can improve her payoff by switching her vote. The common pathology in voting is that even if everyone prefers outcome C to outcome D, a unanimous vote for D is a Nash equilibrium because for any individual, changing his or her vote does not alter the outcome. Therefore voting for D is a best response (see for instance McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, p.99, 138-140) . To avoid these pathological cases, researchers typically focus on weakly undominated equilibria in which voters vote as if their decision matters, i.e. as if they are pivotal. Although it might be the case that (α+ε i +Θ A ) < 0
Next consider the interior case. The existence of an interior equilibrium is best demon-
The value ε m = −F −1 (p) is the threshold in a threshold voting strategy that is consistent with voting for party A with probability p. If Q(p) = 0 then when every other voter supports party A with probability p, voter m is indifferent between supporting A or B when her evaluation of A is
In this scenario, voter m would also support party A with probability p, which is a fixed point. To show that an interior equilibrium exists we need to show that there exist some p ∈ (0, 1), such that Q(p) = 0.
As shown above, as p → 1 then Q(p) → Θ A /3 and as
are continuous in p. Hence, Q(p) is continuous in p and goes from the limit −Θ B /3 < 0 to the limit Θ A /3 > 0 as p goes from 0 to 1. Therefore, Q(p) must cut the x-axis and at this value of p, Q(p) = 0.
The existence of an interior equilibrium is only guaranteed if both parties use a contingent prize allocation rule. If, for example, Θ B = 0, then Q(p) → 0 as p → 0 so there need not be a value of p such that Q(p) = 0. QED.
Asymmetric Interior Equilibria
We now characterize equilibria in which members of a group use the same voting strategy but these strategies differ across groups.
Recall that pure strategy voting occurs only if the outcome of the election is a foregone conclusion. Then, with group symmetry and three voters per group, the possible equilibrium vote totals are permutations of (3,3,3), (0,3,3) and (0,0,3). Further, we have established that p 1 , p 2 , p 3 must either all be pure voting strategies or all must be threshold strategies given within group symmetry and propositions 1 and 2. In the equilibrium shown in figure 2 , the members of groups G 1 and G 3 seek the prizes offered by parties. Since these groups disproportionately support one party, its members know that should that party win they are highly likely to get the prize allocated by that party. Consider the incentives of a voter in group G 1 as the size of the prize becomes large such that p 1 is close to 1 and p 3 is close to zero. If party A wins then it is highly likely that the prize goes to G 1 . Indeed the only likely eventuality in which G 1 does not get the prize from a victorious party A is when all the voters in G 2 support A. This occurs with probability (p 2 ) 3 = 1/8. In this case group G 2 get the prize half the time.
A member of group G 1 might prefer party B on the basis of policy (i.e. ε m < 0) and should this voter support party B she greatly enhances the chance that party B wins.
However, by switching she greatly reduces the chance that her group obtains the prize. Before proceeding to the implications of the model, it is useful to delve into the incentives for group members to coordinate. Consider a representative voter m from group G 1 . Suppose this voter believes that each member of G 2 will vote for party A with probability p 2 and G 3 members support A with probability p 3 . Further, suppose m believes that the other voters in her group will vote for party A with probability p 1 . Substituting these values into the expressions for W A , W B , AP rize A etc enables us to find type, ε * m , of voter m who is indifferent between supporting A and B: Figure 3 plots the probability with which voter m supports party A given her belief about voting behavior, p 1 , p 2 and p 3 , in the groups. Figure 3 is constructed assuming p 2 = .8, p 3 = .2, α = 0 and n = 3. The horizontal axis plots the probability with which the other members of group G 1 support party A (p 1 ). The vertical axis shows the probability with which m supports party A given her beliefs, that is to say, the black line
The figure provides a partial equilibrium analysis in the sense that given expectations about p 2 and p 3 , equilibrium voting behavior within group G 1 is characterized by the points at which F (−ε * m ), the solid black line, cuts the 45 degree line. In particular, given p 2 and p 3 , members of group G 1 are playing best responses if they each vote for A with probability 0.99; if they each vote for A with probability 0.01 or if they each vote for party A 50% of the time.
Although figure 3 is a specific example it illustrates many general themes. Group members endogenously coordinate their voting. If the other members of the group are likely to support A, then voter m is incentivized to vote for A. Once group G 1 is identified with party A, each of the members of G 1 individually wants to reinforce these expectations and support A. Contingent prize allocation rules encourage this endogenous polarization which effectively converts group G 1 from n separate voters making separate voting decisions to a bloc of votes. Yet, there is no coercion. Each individual in the group wants to 21 coordinate with the bloc voting decision.
The size of the contingent prize shapes the degree of endogenous polarization. When prizes are small then the incentive of the group to coordinate is relatively low. The curve in figure 3 (F (−ε * m )), although always increasing, is relatively flat around its extremes. As the size of the prize grows then the incentives to coordinate increase and the function F (−ε * m ) becomes much steeper in the middle and the group forms a more cohesive voting bloc. Eventually, as the size of the prize continues to increase the curve F (−ε * m ) resembles a step function. The presence of contingent prizes encourages the formation of voting blocs and the greater the size of the prizes the tighter these voting blocs are likely to be.
Contingent prize allocation rules provide an alternative explanation to the socialization phenomenon observed by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) The political socialization and the rational response to coordinate differ in the time scale they take to act.
8

Turnout
As we noted at the outset, a major critique of the rational voting literature has been to question why people vote given that the individual voter's chance of influencing the electoral outcome is vanishingly small as the size of the electorate grows. The contingent prize model offers an explanation as to why voters turnout even when their vote is unlikely 8 Redistricting offers another opportunity to study the model's vote coordination argument.
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to alter who wins. What is more, it identifies which groups of voters are most likely to vote. The shaded area in figure 3 assesses the probability that a voter will abstain when voting is costly.
Thus far we have treated voting as costless and assumed full turnout. However, suppose voting is costly. In the case shown in figure 3 , the cost of voting is c = .4. Generalizing from the model and assuming any ties are split by a coin flip, we can calculate m's payoff from supporting A or B using the formulae derived above minus the cost of voting. We can also derive the expected payoff from abstaining. The height of the shaded area in figure 3 indicates the probability with which m abstains. Obviously as the cost of voting (c) increases, m is more likely to abstain. More interestingly, the analysis shows that m is more likely to abstain when her group is indecisive with respect to which party it supports. When most members of group G 1 will vote for party A (the right hand side of figure 3), m strongly supports A and is unlikely to abstain. However, when group G 1 's support for A is more variable (in the middle of figure 3), voter m has less incentive to turnout, as evidenced by the greater height of the shaded area in figure 3 when p is around 0.5. When group G 1 is not strongly affiliated with one party, this group has a relatively low chance of winning the prize, so its members make their electoral choice based on their evaluation of the party. When m is relatively indifferent between the two parties in terms of policy evaluation (α + ε m ≈ 0), m has little incentive to pay the cost of voting unless the election is likely to be close.
The extent to which pivotalness affects turnout depends upon group membership.
Turnout is high in groups which strongly identify with one party. Further turnout in such groups is relatively insensitive to the closeness of the race since members of such groups are motivated by the competition for prizes. Party machines, such as New York's Tammany Hall, generate high turnout from their core constituencies even in relatively uncontested elections (Allen 1993; Myers 1971) . The voters in these core democratic neighborhoods are voting even though they are confident about the outcome of the election: they want to win prizes (pork) from their party. In contrast, in groups which are not strongly affiliated with a particular party, turnout is likely to be lower and more dependent upon the closeness of the race. Voters in such groups have little prospect of 23 capturing the prize and so vote only to influence the electoral outcome. Consequently, they are more likely to turnout when the election is expected to be close. The empirical literature shows turnout is higher in close elections. The model suggests that the elasticity between turnout and closeness is greater in competitive precincts than in precincts which predominantly support one party.
INCUMBENCY AND POLICY CHOICE
Contingent prize allocation rules allow hegemonic parties to remain dominant even when they are widely recognized as offering inferior benefits relative to other parties. Magaloni (2006) , for example, documents the persistence of the dominant PRI party in Mexico after it had been thoroughly discredited. The model provides an explanation for such persistence. It also explains the policy choices of different parties.
If a hegemonic party relies predominantly on contingently allocated prizes, then it incentivizes voters to support it. As shown above, everyone voting for a single party is an equilibrium. It is also a very robust outcome. While no one is pivotal in terms of altering the electoral outcome, everyone is pivotal in terms of the prize allocation. This equilibrium persists even when everyone recognizes that they would be better off under an alternative government. Suppose that for all voters α + ε i + Θ A < 0, such that even under the best case scenario every voter prefers party B to party A. It is still the case that A can win. A contingent prize allocation rule makes it hard for reformers to win, even if every voter recognizes that the reformer has the best policies and will produce the most benefits. The reformer's electoral problem is that while every voter might want the reformer to win, each voter wants the reformer to win with someone else's votes. Since the PTI ran on a platform of honest public goods provision, the benefits accrued to people whether they voted for it or not. This is not the case with a patronage or pork-oriented party. Unless the voters were certain the PML-N would lose and hence could not reward their most supportive groups, voters want to vote for the PML-N to enhance their prospects of receiving the prizes that it offered. Reformist parties have real problems challenging entrenched patronage parties. Everyone might want them to succeed but everyone also wants someone else to vote the reformist into power.
The model not only explains why Imran Khan's reformist party was unsuccessful, it also explains why Khan pursued a reformist agenda while the incumbents persist in their policies of handing out prizes. Suppose party A contemplates increasing the benefits it offers. It might for instance improve the quality of its public goods provision or reduce taxes. Such policy shifts improve welfare for all citizens and so can be operationalized as an increase in α. Alternatively, A might off a non-contingent prize θ if it is elected. 
The marginal returns to increased public goods and increased non-contingent prizes are 1. In contrast, the marginal return to an increase in the size of the contingent prize is
. That is, the marginal return to increased contingent prizes is the ratio of the prize pivotalness to outcome pivotalness. As can be seen in figure 1 , when p is low and voters are unlikely to support party A, this ratio is relatively low. 10 In contrast as p increases then the ratio becomes very large. A party's electoral prospects determine which policies are most likely to garner it electoral support.
Established incumbent parties promote contingent prizes at the expense of increased public goods. In contrast, non-incumbent parties are reformist and promote public goods. However, the change in vote probability for party A from these policy changes depends upon the level of party affiliation by the group. When group G 1 is likely to vote for party A (RHS of figure 4) then increasing the size of the prize improves A's electoral chances more than an increase in public goods. The reverse is true when group G 1 is unlikely to support party A (low p 1 , LHS of figure 4). It shows that the likelihood that voter m supports party A changes as A increases its contingent prize Θ A but at the expense of decreasing public goods (α) (Lizzeri and Persico 2001) . When group G 1 is likely to support party A, such a shift enhances A's electoral prospects. Yet, when A is unlikely to garner the support of group G 1 , such a shift away from public goods towards more prizes diminishes A's vote share in group G 1 . New 10 In an earlier paper (Smith and Bueno de Mesquita 2009), we proved that in the fully symmetric case
> 1/3 for all p for all n ≤ 99.
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political parties focus on the provision of public goods while incumbent parties promote prizes at the expense of public goods provisions. In light of these predictions, it is small wonder why the Tammany leader George Washington Plunket ran around New York offering clothing, comfort and shelter to fire victims in strongly democratic neighborhoods rather than implementing the building and fire code standards that would prevent fires in the first place (Allen 1993, Ch. 6; Riordon 1995) .
Credibility and Contingent Prizes
Before concluding we contrast the contingent prize setup with traditional patronage arguments. In standard patronage arguments, party or machine candidates offer individual voters rewards in exchange for their vote. Such a mechanism is plagued with credibility problems (Stokes 2007) . If the reward is paid out in anticipation of the vote, the party or candidate cannot be confident that the voter will actually vote the agreed way. If the vote is secret, the party or candidate cannot know whether the voter-beneficiary lived up to his or her part of the bargain. If the personal benefit is promised for delivery after the election then the voter cannot be confident that the candidate or party, once elected, will pay out the benefits rather than pocketing them. So, neither the voter nor the candidate or party can credibly commit to the patronge-for-votes deal.
The patronage mechanism is further complicated because parties do not hand out enough patronage to reward all their supporters. Evidence from Argentina suggests that the contingent prize account is more compelling than the traditional quid pro quo explanation. Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) examined whether people who received gifts from a party feel compelled to vote for it. They found that few respondents to their survey felt such an obligation. Consistent with these results, Guterbock (1980) found that in Chicago those who received party service were no more likely to vote Democratic.
Scholars have considered a variety of solutions to the issue of credibility in direct exchange models of patronage. For instance, Robinson and Verdier (2002) propose an economic explanation. They assume parties are better able to extract rents from some groups compared to others which de facto ties the fates of particular workers to particular parties. Other approaches look at reputation. For instance, drawing on the literature on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma setting, Stokes (2005) invokes a trigger punishment system to explain why parties deliver rewards and voters support them. If a party fails to deliver rewards then voters don't support it in the future, and if voters take bribes but fail to support the party then they never receive bribes in the future. This punishment mechanism requires the party to know how individuals vote, which could explain why patronage works best in tight-knit communities.
The contingent prize argument does not suffer from these credibility issues. The mechanism does not rely on the credibility of the individual voter's commitment nor on the party's ability to monitor the individual voters. Voters support the party, not in response to past gifts, but in the hope of winning the prize for their group in the form of pork;
that is, local public goods. Only a few voters or blocs need to receive rewards in order to stimulate competition for the scarce prizes in the future. The only significant credibility issue here is whether parties can commit to allocate prizes after they are elected. This is readily resolved by an argument that relies on verifiable, discernible vote-shares by precinct/group. Provided that the party cares about its electoral future it hands out prizes.
There is considerable disagreement in the patronage and voting literatures as to whether parties reward core supporters or swing voters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Hicken 2007; McGillivray 2004; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Stokes 2005 ).
When viewed from the contingent prize allocation perspective these differences do not seem so irreconcilable. Our model considered a single electoral district with multiple precincts. Suppose we extend the model such that a party needs to carry two of three electoral districts to win and each district is composed of three precincts. If these districts differ in marginality then we conjecture that the party's best strategy is to offer a large prize for the most supportive precinct in the marginal district. Such a strategy maximizes the party's chance of securing the support of voters in the marginal district which is key for victory. When related back to the debate about core supports versus swing voters, the party is doing both. It gives the largest prize to the swing district, but within that district it rewards those who support it.
CONCLUSION
A contingent prize allocation rule explains how parties can incentivize voters to support them by offering to reward those groups that provide the greatest level of political support.
Given such an incentive scheme, the voters support the party, not because they like its policies, but because they want to win the prize for their group. Voters can be pivotal in two senses. They can determine the outcome of the election -outcome pivotal-and they can alter the distribution of political rewards-prize pivotal. In large electorates, each voter's influence on the outcome of the election is miniscule. But not so with regard to the allocation of the prize. Given that the prize incentive dominates the incentive to influence which party wins, voters will sometimes even vote for parties whose policies harm their welfare. Further the desire to win the prize motivates people to vote even though who will win the election is a forgone conclusion.
The contingent prize scheme works when parties observe the electoral support of groups and target rewards to those groups that are most supportive. We have focused on geographical precincts because this is a common way in which voters are partitioned into
groups. Yet, in the theory there is nothing special about this partition. All that really matters is that parties observe votes by groups and can target rewards to those groups.
The system fails if the technology of policy provision makes it difficult to target rewards to groups. The increasing complexity and scale of public policy projects has led to increasing professionalization and the requirement of talented and trained civil servants rather than just party loyalists. These technological changes can constrain the ability of parties to target rewards to certain groups although pork barrel legislation is a means for elected officials to circumvent the old patronage system through appointment to jobs. That is, the prevalence and nature of patronage changes as the types of goods and services that government provides changes.
Chandra (2004), Hale (2007) and Levitsky (2007) all report that parties use the counting of votes at the subdistrict level to measure electoral support. This is a way that parties partially get around the secret ballot. In the context of geographical grouping, parties can be better incentivized to produce public goods rather than pork if votes are pooled and counted at the district level and not the precinct level. If the ballot boxes from 29 all precincts are taken to a central district level office and votes from all the precincts are counted together, then the contingent prize allocation rule can not be used. This suggests both an experiment to test the arguments made here and a public policy fix (albeit one that may contradict both the interests of politicians and of some voters). If the votes were pooled at a larger district in some randomly chosen cities or provinces in a patronage prone nation, then we should expect differences in the policies and politics between areas where votes are pooled compared to those counted at the local level. 
